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The Trade Secret Quagmire in
Pennsylvania: A Mandate for
Statutory Clarification
I. Introduction
A trade secret is confidential subject matter that stimulates ac-
tual or potential economic advantages for the possessor.' The use of
trade secrets has promoted efficient operating procedures, boosted
production, and provided commercial advantages over competitors.
Concomitant with industrial growth and technological advances,
misappropriation2 of trade secrets has proliferated. Although so-
phisticated techniques have been used to obtain trade secrets, subtle
approaches are more common and may induce knowledgeable em-
ployees to switch employment allegiances with offers of promotions,
higher salaries, and greater fringe benefits.
Lacking civil statutory guidance,3 Pennsylvania courts assumed
an active role in protecting trade secrets. Since the 1960's, however,
strict standards to qualify for protection have developed.' More-
over, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has clearly favored the
"free spirit of competition"5 and the right of employee mobility over
restrictive covenants or protection by operation of law.6
By coupling strict standards for relief and strong public policy
1. See Part III, Section A infra
2. Broadly defined, misappropriation is the conversion to one's own use and profit of an
intangible trade value created by the labor, skill or investment of another. The doctrine of
misappropriation, as that phrase is used herein refers to the equitable principle that a commer-
cial enterprise has an enforceable proprietary interest in trade values it has created. See Inter-
national News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See also Comment, The
Misappropriation Doctrine .After the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 81 DICK. L. REv. 469
(1977).
3. Although a statute affording substantive property rights in trade secrets has not been
enacted, Pennsylvania has promulgated statutes concerning State administrative agencies or
executive bodies that regulate the dissemination of trade secrets once obtained by the adminis-
trative agency. See 3 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 58.12(f) (Purdon Supp. 1980) (Commercial
Feed Law); 35 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 4013.2 (Purdon Supp. 1980) (Air Pollution Control
Act); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 390-8 (Purdon Supp. 1980) (Pharmacy Act); 71 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 307-3 (Purdon Supp. 1980) (authority for the Bureau of Consumer Protection to
maintain trade secrecy). In addition, Pennsylvania has enacted a criminal law statute for trade
secret protection. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3930 (Purdon 1973).
4. See Part III, section C bfra
5. Spring Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 362, 162 A.2d 370, 374 (1960).
6. See Part III ia
against restraint of liberty or trade, Pennsylvania courts have ren-
dered trade secret protection nearly illusory. Consequently, the leg-
islature of Pennsylvania should seriously consider the adoption of
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.7 This comment addresses the im-
pact of recent decisions and the need for promulgating civil statutory
trade secret protection in Pennsylvania.
II. Judicial Recognition of Trade Secret Protection
A. Federal Preemption
Since the nineteenth century, English courts have recognized a
legally protectable interest in trade secrets.' Applying equitable
principles, federal courts followed English practice and a full body
of case law developed. Relying on tort9 and contract 0 concepts that
curb intentional misappropriation of proprietary information, state
courts carved out trade secret protection independent of federal cov-
erage.I' In addition, a majority of states enacted civil'
2 or criminal 13
statutes to deter the pilfering of trade secrets. These statutes and
common law provided protection for unpatented and uncopyrighted
subject matter. State trade secret law did not come into conflict with
federal patent and copyright statutes until 1964, when a conflict
arose over the protection of unpatented products in the public do-
main. "4
In the companion cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., '5
7. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (approved Feb. 1980). Presently only Minnesota has
adopted the Act. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325C.01 (West Supp. 1981).
8. See, e.g., Morison v. Moat, 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (1851). See also Orenbuch, Trade
Secrets and the Patent Laws, 52 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 638, 639-44 (1970).
9. See notes 92-95 and accompanying text infra.
10. See Part III section B infra.
11. The first reported case in America to draw from English common law was Peabody v.
Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868). See also Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210
Pa. 464, 60 A. 4 (1904); Fralich v. Despar, 165 Pa. 24, 30 A. 521 (1894).
12. The following statutes afford trade secrets the status of a substantive property right:
CAL. CIv. CODE § 980 (West 1954); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-408 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 812.081 (West supp. 1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 15.1 (1969); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-3048
(Bums Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 722 (West Supp. 1973); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 93, § 42 (Michie Supp. 1970); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 752.71 (West Supp. 1976); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.52 (West Supp. 1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 41-211 (1961); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 548.01 (Supp. 1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2(1) (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:119-
5.1 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-A-16-23 (Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-75.1
(1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.51 (Page Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1732 (West
Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4238 (1975); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.205 (West Supp.
1970). See also ABA SECTION OF PAT., T.M., AND COPYRIGHT LAW, No. 402 (1977).
13. See GA. CODE § 26-1809 (1975); IDAHO CODE § 18-2001 (1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 155.00(c) (McKinney 1967); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3930 (Purdon 1973); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 31.05 (Vernon 1974).
14. See generally Wydick, Trade Secrets.- Federal Preemption in Light of Goldstein and
Kewanee, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'" 734 (1973); Comment, Accommodation of Federal Patents and
the State Interest in Trade Secrets, 16 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 171 (1974).
15. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc., 16 the United States
Supreme Court held that unpatented products in the public domain
were free to be copied. The Court ruled that state trade secret laws,
which proscribed the duplication of unpatented products, clashed
with the purpose of the federal patent laws, which encouraged dis-
closure of inventions in exchange for a seventeen year monopoly. 7
Nevertheless, the Sears and Compco decisions left open the issue of
the extent to which state law could protect unpatented products
without encroaching upon the federal patent scheme. In response,
lower courts distinguished between ideas placed in the public do-
main and those still held in secret. Since secrecy was required to
qualify for trade secret protection, but by definition not for patent
protection, state trade secret laws did not conflict with federal patent
laws.
The conflict between federal and state law surfaced again eight
years later in a copyright dispute. In Goldstein v. California, 18 the
Court addressed the issue of copyright preemption and upheld a
California penal statute that prohibited the copying of phonograph
records and tapes for profit. The Court opined that the copyright
clause of the Constitution was nonexclusive in its grant of power to
Congress to protect private interests. The states could, therefore,
protect certain individualized interests even though Congress could
preempt the area if it chose to do so. 9 The Court recognized highly
16. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
17. In both decisions the issue was whether state unfair competition statutes that prohib-
ited copying an unpatented industrial design also conflicted with federal patent laws. The
copied items, a pole lamp in Sears and a lighting reflector in Compco, had originally received
design patents that were subsequently declared invalid. Since both items were copied after
they have been marketed, neither product could have received trade secret protection because
both were in the public domain. See generally Comment, Trade Secrets-Federal Patent Code
Does Not Preempt State Trade Secret Statutes, 28 RuT. L. REV. 191 (1974).
Five years after Sears, the Court reexamined the preemptive scope of patent protection in
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). The Lear court held that a licensee was not es-
topped from alleging an invalid patent to avoid paying royalties in a licensing agreement. The
Court, however, failed to explain the scope of federal preemption of state law enforcement of
private licensing agreements regulating access to unpatented products. Justice Black's sweep-
ing dissent clearly opposed state regulation. "The national policy expressed in the patent laws,
favoring free competition and narrowly limiting monopoly, cannot be frustrated by private
agreements among individuals with or without the approval of the State." Id at 677 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
In addition, courts have adhered to the principle that patents are for inventions, not for
mere improvements. "Only inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge,
and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly."
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966). The basic requirements of a patentable
invention are couched in negative language:
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not
be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
18. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
19. The individualized interests in Goldstein, were considered published "writings" that
diverse commercial concerns and the states' interest in protecting in-
tellectual property.20 The result was that state law survived even in
areas where Congress was empowered to regulate.2
The Supreme Court settled the federal preemption question 22 in
Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corp.,23 when it announced that
state protection of trade secrets is preempted only if it "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."24 The Kewanee court acknowledged
the need for state protection of proprietary information not in the
public domain. This protection, however, was not unlimited. Under
the Kewanee preemptive test, state trade secret laws would be void if
they clashed "with the objectives of the federal patent laws' 25 or
substantially dissuaded holders of patentable inventions from seek-
ing patents. 26  The Court stated that only direct encroachment on
federal laws was sufficient to trigger a federal preemption attack,
thus firmly establishing the validity of state trade secret protection.
did not fall within the scope of the federal copyright law. Accordingly, no legislative intent
that a type of work is freely copyable may be inferred from its exclusion from statutory cover-
age; rather such works may be deemed to be of purely local importance and proper subjects of
state protection. See also Comment, The Misappropriation Doctrine After the Copyright Revi-
sion Act of 1976, 81 DICK. L. REv. 469 (1977).
20. Patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets compose the field of law known as
intellectual property. Each of the first three have statutorily fixed terms. See 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1970) (seventeen years for patents); 17 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West 1977) (copyrights, life of the
author plus fifty years or seventy-five years for certain types of work); 15 U.S.C. § 1058, 1059
(1976) (federal trademark registration valid for twenty years and renewable for twenty year
terms thereafter).
Trade secrets, however, have the potential for unlimited protection. A trade secret may
last for seven minutes or seventy years. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b
(1939). See generally Comment, Trade Secrets.- How Long Should an Injunction Last, 26
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 203 (1978).
21. See, e.g., Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Contra, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Morgan
v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
22. Although Kewanee appeared to settle the preemption question, there have been deci-
sions challenging its rationale. See, e.g., Quick Point Pencil Co. v. Aronson, 567 F.2d 757
(1977); Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, [19801 496 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1. See also Altman, A
Quick Point Regarding Perpetual Trade Secret Royalty Liability, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 127 (1979).
23. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). In Kewanee, plaintiff company took sixteen years to perfect an
industrial crystal. Only nine months after leaving plaintiffs employment, defendants pro-
duced a comparable crystal prompting plaintiff to seek injunctive relief and damages for trade
secret misappropriation. The district court, applying Ohio trade secret law, granted a perma-
nent injunction. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Ohio's trade secret
law conflicted with the underlying policy of the federal patent laws. The Supreme Court re-
versed on certiorari.
24. Id at 479.
25. Id at 480.
26. The Court did establish a state limit on trade secret protection: "If a State, through a
system of protection, were to cause a substantial risk that holders of patentable inventions
would not seek patents, but rather would rely on the state protection, we would be compelled
to hold that such a system could not constitutionally continue to exist." Id at 489. See also
Stern, A Reexamination of Pre-emption of State Trade Secret Law After Kewanee, 42 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 927 (1974).
B. The Balance Between Federal and State Protection
The comity doctrine is the underlying reason for not restraining
state laws that protect special interests." This notion is based on the
federal government's respect for state interests and on the recogni-
tion that state governments function better when left alone. Comity
mandates sensitivity to both legitimate state and federal interests.
The supremacy clause28 of the United States Constitution acts as a
check on this relationship since a state law will fail if it interferes
unduly with the accomplishment of congressional objectives.29
In the trade secret context, states have a legitimate interest in
maintaining standards of good faith and fair dealing to support com-
mercial and industrial expansion.3" Passive discouragement of mis-
appropriation has proved inadequate; statutory guidelines are
essential.3 '
Trade secret laws, like federal patent and copyright laws, reflect
a public concern for providing adequate protection of proprietary
information. Uniform trade secret laws encourage invention in un-
patentable areas and prompt the independent innovator to proceed
with exploitation of the invention.32 Thus, competition "is fostered
and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite
patentable invention. '33 States have a legitimate interest in the pro-
tection of trade secrets and a responsibility to promote such protec-
tion.
III. Trade Secret Protection in Pennsylvania
A. Establishment of a Trade Secret
1. Defnitional Problems. -The major obstacle to the plaintiff
who seeks equitable relief"4 against misappropriation is establishing
27. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
29. Compare Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) and Campbell v.
Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) with
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) and Maurer v. Hamil-
ton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) and Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937). See also Hart, The
Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954); Note, Pre-emption as
a Preferential Ground. A Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
30. See R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MO-
NOPOLIES (3d ed. 1968); H. NIMs, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS, (2d
ed. 1976); Hays, Unfair Competition-Another Decade, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 51 (1963).
31. See notes 97-105 and accompanying text infra.
32. Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 485.
33. Id
34. When trade secrets are misappropriated, the amount of damages is often highly spec-
ulative because of the difficulty of estimating the possessor's loss or the misappropriator's gain.
Upon a showing of irreparable harm, the remedy may be an injunction prohibiting the use or
disclosure of the proprietary information. If, at the time the remedy is awarded, the informa-
tion is still secret, the injunction may be of indefinite length to protect secrecy. See, e.g., Win-
ston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965); Conmar
Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949); Shellmar Prods. Co.
prima facie evidence that a trade secret exists. Trade secrets have
been described as "extraordinarily difficult to define."' Neverthe-
less, courts have found that trade secrets include, inter alia, chemical
formulas,36 industrial processes,37 pricing information,3" customer
lists, 39 and sources for supplies.i' Business ideas,4 layouts,42 and
know-how4 3 have been rejected as trade secrets. Factual distinctions
in each case have prevented the development of a litmus test in de-
termining the elements of a trade secret.
Pennsylvania has adopted section 757 of the Restatement of
Torts,' which extends trade secret protection to "any formula, pat-
tern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it."45 Accordingly, any
substantially secret' subject matter that is used continuously in busi-
ness47 to give its possessor a competitive advantage may be consid-
ered a trade secret.48
v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1937); Berryhill,
Trade Secret Litigation: Injunctions and Other Equitable Remedies, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 189
(1977); Johnson, Remedies in Trade Secret Litigation, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 1004 (1978); Com-
ment, Trade Secrets: How Long ShouldAn Injunction Last, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 203 (1978).
35. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., Inc., 378 F. Supp. 806, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
36. Platinum Prods. Corp. v. Berthold, 280 N.Y. 752, 211 N.E.2d 520 (1939).
37. Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 29 N.J. Super. 361, 102 A.2d 90 (1954), af?'d 16 N.J. 252,
108 A.2d 442 (1954).
38. Simmons Hardward Co. v. Waibel, I S.D. 488, 47 N.W. 814 (1891).
39. See Part IV, section B infra. Compare Town and Country House and Homes Serv.,
Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314, 189 A.2d 390 (1963) with Spring Steels Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa.
354, 162 A.2d 370 (1960).
40. Water Servs. Inc. v. Tesco Chems. Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969).
41. Richter v. Westab Inc., 529 F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1976). Plaintiff developed a concept to
market notebooks and binders with covers containing fashion designs and fabrics advertised in
fashion magazines. The court held that a marketing concept or new product idea did not
qualify as a trade secret and thus did not warrant protection.
42. Arco Industries Corp. v. Chemcast, 633 F.2d 435 (6th Cir. 1980).
43. Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 488 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Van Products Co. v.
General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965). Contra, Space Aero
Prods. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74 (1965); Manos v. Melton, 358 Mich.
500, 100 N.W.2d 235 (1960). See also notes 104 and accompanying text infra.
44. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939). Pennsylvania adopted the Re-
statement definition of trade secrets in Van Prods. Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co.,
419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965).
45. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b at 5 (1939). A different definition of a
trade secret is "a term of art referring to some forms of know-how which have a high degree of
secrecy and novelty, and to some commercial secrets such as customer lists." Note, Licenses,
84 HA.nv. L. REV. 477 n.l (1970). See also Painten & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 222 (2d
Cir. 1971). Note, Master and Servant-Equit--Protection of Information in the Nature of
Trade Secrets, 14 MINN. L. REV. 546 (1930).
46. See notes 55-68 and accompanying text infra. The view adopted by the Restatement
is that only a "substantial element of secrecy must exist." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757,
Comment b at 6 (1939).
47. The Restatement makes it clear that confidential information not continuously used
in one's business cannot be a trade secret. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939)
with RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 759 (1939). See also notes 175, 176 and accompanying text
infra.
48. Other factors to be considered in determining whether a trade secret exists include,
inter alA (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the business; (2) the
In practice, Pennsylvania courts demand more than mere com-
pliance with the Restatement and have developed a stricter standard
for relief. Pennsylvania's standard requires that the secret be spe-
CJfCi49 before it qualifies for judicial protection. 0  Pennsylvania
courts have therefore rejected certain customer lists,
5 ' designs, 52
business information 53 and customer appeal data5 4 as trade secrets.
Consequently, the full scope of protection that would normally be
accorded under the Restatement of Torts definition is not provided
by applicable Pennsylvania law.
2. Conduct. -Secrecy is the sine qua non for obtaining trade
secret protection. Although courts disagree on the degree of secrecy
necessary to engender judicial protection,55 it is clear that absolute
secrecy is not required. The precondition to trade secret protection
in Pennsylvania is that an owner take "reasonable measures"' 56 to
gain protection. Other courts also require "sufficient measures" 57 or
an "active course of conduct58 to establish secrecy. The totality of
the circumstances is frequently considered in determining the degree
of secrecy maintained by the trade secret owner. It has been sug-
gested that if the employee has or should have reason to regard cer-
tain information as confidential and valuable, the employer need not
extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the business; (3) the extent of
measures taken by the possessor to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the
information to the possessor and his rivals; (5) the amount of effort or money expended in
developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be
properly acquired or duplicated by others. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b
(1939). See generaly Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 437
(1960).
Novelty in the patent sense is not a prerequisite under the Restatement definition. Some
courts, however, have required minimal novelty. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470 (1974); Arco Indus. Corp. v. Chemcast, 633 F.2d 435 (6th Cir. 1980).
49. Pennsylvania courts distinguish between specific secrets and general business secrets.
The character of the proprietary information, if it is peculiar and important to the business, is
not material. The information, however, must be the particular secrets of the plaintiff, and not
the general secrets of the trade.
50. Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 623, 136 A.2d 838, 842
(1957).
51. Spring Steels Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 162 A.2d 370 (1960).
52. Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 488 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
53. Trilog Assocs., Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287 (1974).
54. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. L-M Manufacturing Co., 256 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1958).
55. Compare, International Election Systems Corp. v. Shoup, 452 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (no trade secret protection since employees had free access to information) with Affili-
ated Hospital Products, Inc. v. Baldwin, 15 III. 528, 373 N.E.2d 1000 (1978) (trade secret pro-
tection awarded since employer took great care to maintain secrecy). See also R. MILORAM,
TRADE SECRETS § 4.02 (12th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as R. MILGRAMl; M. Pope & P. Pope,
Protection of Proprietary Interests in Computer Software, 30 ALA. L. REV. 527 (1979).
56. Greenberg v. Croyden Plastics Co., Inc., 378 F. Supp. 806, 813 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Con-
tra, Pressed Steel Car v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 A. 4 (1904). The court
maintained that a certain amount of publicity is unavoidable and "an unlocked door is not an
invitation to. . .the servant of the household to help himself." 210 Pa. at 472, 60 A. at 8.
57. Arco Indus. Corp. v. Chemcast, 633 F.2d 435, 443 (6th Cir. 1980).
58. Eastern Marble Prods. Corp. v. Roman Marble, 376 Mass. 290, 294, 364 N.E.2d 799,
802 (1977).
put the employee on notice that the matter should be regarded as
secret.59 Pennsylvania courts, however, generally require express no-
tice to employees.6"
As a practical matter, trade secrets may enter the public domain
by independent discovery,6 I reverse engineering,62 intentional or un-
6316intentional publication, or industrial espionage.' Under the
Sears65 and Compco 66 decisions, once a trade secret is in the public
domain, any competitor may duplicate and use it without fear of
judicial sanction.67 Thus, even though an owner possesses a valua-
ble trade secret, lack of proper security or extrinsic revelation can
completely destroy the trade secret's benefits and potentially cause
catastrophic economic losses.68
3. Property Rights. -There is no judicial consensus on whether
trade secrets should be considered property rights of the owner.69
Despite the discord, relief often depends on whether the court con-
siders trade secrets as property.7 ° Some jurisdictions, including
59. See R. MILORAM, supra note 55, § 5.02[21 at 5-15.
60. Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612
(1967).
61. Duplication of a trade secret through independent invention will not result in judicial
sanctions. Thus, an independent invention, once placed in the public domain, destroys the
preexisting trade secret.
62. Reverse engineering is a process whereby one starts with a known product and dis-
sects its composition to obtain the process which led to the product's development or manufac-
ture. See Midland Ross Corp. v. Sunbeam Equip. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1970);
New England Overall Co. v. Woltmann, 343 Mass. 69, 176 N.E.2d 193 (1961).
63. Frequently, trade secrets are destroyed due to disclosures in trade publications, com-
pany reports, communications by employees to outsiders, and negotiations with potential cus-
tomers. Lecture by Prof. William J. Keating, Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, PA (Nov. 12,
1980).
64. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1024, rehearing denied, 401 U.S. 967 (1971); College Watercolor Group, Inc.
v. Win. H. Newbauer, Inc., 468 Pa. 103, 360 A.2d 200 (1976). See also Comment, Industrial
Espionage. Piracy of Secret Scien~fic and Technical Information, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 911,
927-34 (1967); Comment, Thief of Trade Secrets: The Needfor a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA.
L. REV. 378 (1971).
65. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
66. See notes 16, 17 and accompanying text supra.
67. Trilog Assocs., Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287 (1974); Denawetz v.
Milch, 407 Pa. 115, 178 A.2d 701 (1962).
68. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 226 (2d Cir. 1971). The value of stolen
trade secrets has been estimated as $2 billion per year. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1965, § 1, at 53,
col. 6.
69. Compare R. MILGRAM, supra note 55, § 1.01 (yes) and R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 52 (uncommitted) with R. ELLIS,
TRADE SECRETS 118 (1953) (not an essential inquiry) and Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO
L.J. 4 (1962) (no).
70. Property is an elastic term. "Decisions contain a myriad of statements to the effect
that an invention, discovery, trade secret or other product of original creation or development
is 'property'; or that the originator, inventor, discoverer or possessor has a property, 'quasi-
property'; a 'right of property' or a 'kind of property' thereon." Swartz, Protection ofIntangible
Interests, 49 MASS. L.Q. 107, 109 (1964).
In Schuster v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 395 Pa. 441, 149 A.2d 447 (1959), the
supreme court attempted to define property as "practically all rights, the term being indicative
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Pennsylvania, adopt the property rights analysis and require plain-
tiffs to prove a preexisting trade secret and a breach of a duty to
maintain secrecy.7 Other courts reject the property rights approach
and look to how the information was obtained during the business
relationship.72 Under the latter approach, plaintiffs burden of proof
is easier to meet because a preexisting trade secret does not have to
be shown.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently rejected the
property rights analysis.73 The leading federal case on trade secrets
as property is EL duPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 74 in
which Justice Holmes announced his "starting point" test: "The
property may be denied, but the confidence cannot be. Therefore,
the starting point for the present matter is not property. . . but that
the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs. 75
The Masland test has been followed by only a minority of jurisdic-
tions.76
Pennsylvania takes a different approach than that of the United
States Supreme Court. In Morgan's Home Equipment Corp. v. Mar-
tucci, 77 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that trade
secrets constitute property of the owner. In a subsequent decision,
Van Products Co. v. General Welding and Fabricating Co., 78 the court
clearly refuted Holmes' "starting point" test by positing that "[tjhe
starting point in every case . . . is not whether there was a confiden-
tial relationship, but whether, in fact, there was a trade secret to be
misappropriated. ' ' 79  Hence, in Pennsylvania, plaintiffs must over-
and descriptive of every possible interest which a person can have, in any and everything that
is subject of ownership by man. ... 395 Pa. at 448, 149 A.2d at 453.
71. See notes 77-79 and accompanying text infra
72. The Seventh Circuit favors this approach for trade secret protection since the focus is
on the confidential relationship rather than the proprietary information. In Smith v. Dravo
Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953), the court used a 'but for' test to establish whether the trade
secrets were misappropriated. The court stated that "but for those. . . transactions defendant
would not have learned from plaintiffs, of the [trade secrets]." Id at 377. Contra, Van Prods.
Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965).
73. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). See notes 23-26 and accom-
panying text supra.
74. 244 U.S. 100 (1917). The Court explained:
The word 'property' as applied to. . . trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of
certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudi-
mentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret




76. Plastic and Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Roy, 163 Conn. 257, 303 A.2d 725 (1972);
Lockridge v. Tweco Prods., Inc., 209 Kan. 289, 497 P.2d 131 (1972); Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson,
123 N.H. 203, 419 A.2d 1115 (1980).
77. 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957).
78. 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965).
79. 419 Pa. at 268, 213 A.2d at 780 (emphasis added). See notes 102-105 and accompa-
nying text infra
come the definitional problems of trade secrets before proceeding to
establish a legal basis for relief. This added burden often spells de-
feat even when plaintiff can prove defendant breached a confidential
relationship.
B. Protection by Operation of Law- The Legal Basesfor Relief
1. Express Contract. -In the course of a normal business rela-
tionship, a possessor of trade secrets may find it necessary to disclose
proprietary information to another business entity, to an employee,
or during negotiations. To maintain a competitive business edge,
however, the owner seeks to avoid unnecessary or improper disclo-
sure of trade secrets.80 Indeed, many employers obtain insurance
against such disclosure by imposing restrictive covenants on employ-
ees likely or certain to be exposed to secret proprietary informa-
tion.8 '
Generally, restrictive covenants generate judicial hostility.8 2 Al-
though independent contracts in restraint of trade are void as against
public policy,83 Pennsylvania courts have accepted and even en-
couraged" execution of restrictive covenants, if the agreement is an-
cillary85 to an employment or business contract. Nevertheless,
restrictive covenants tied to employment contracts require "a more
stringent test of reasonableness"86 than restrictive covenants in a
80. See notes 56-60 supra
81. In a similar context, trade secret licensing is the foundation of an important industry.
Such licenses may employ various provisions concerning the duration of royalty liability. Fur-
thermore, licenses may provide that royalties will be payable only for a prescribed term, for
however long the licensed subject matter in fact remains secret; or they may require royalty
liability to continue as long as the licensee uses the licensed subject matter, even if secrecy
should terminate first. Altman, A Quick Point Regarding Trade Secret Royalty Liability, 13 J.
MAR. L. REV. 127, 128 (1979). See also Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. John J.
Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), a fdper curiam, 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960).
82. Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387, 42 S.E.2d 352 (1947); Brecher v. Brown,
235 Iowa 627, 17 N.W.2d 609 (1958). See also R. MILGRAM, supra note 55, § 3.02 [2] at 3-39;
Comment, Employee Nondisclosure Convenants and Antitrust Law, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 417
(1971).
83. Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612
(1967). Contra, Trilog Assocs., Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287 (1974).
84. Spring Steels Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 362, 162 A.2d 370, 374 (1960); Pennsylvania
Funds Corp. v. Vogel, 399 Pa. 1, 159 A.2d 472 (1960).
85. Judge Taft of the Sixth Circuit (later Chief Justice of the United States) explained the
ancillary rule:
It has long been the rule at common law, that contracts in restraint of trade made
independently of a sale of a business or contract of employment are void as against
public policy regardless of the valuableness of the consideration exchanged therein.
[The] very statement of the rule implies that the contract must be one in which there
is a main purpose, to which the covenant in restraint is merely ancillary. The cove-
nant is inserted only to protect one of the parties from the injury which ... he may
suffer from the unrestrained competition of the other.
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
86. Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 632, 136 A.2d 838, 846
(1957).
business agreement 87 because courts pay greater deference to em-
ployees' rights than to competitors bargaining in arm's length trans-
actions. Moreover, a nondisclosure agreement has been found
reasonable if it satisfies a three-prong test.88 To succeed, the express
covenant must be (1) reasonable in time; (2) reasonable in geograph-
ical extent; and (3) reasonably necessary to protect the employer,
without imposing an undue hardship on the employee.8 9
Quite often, however, employers with trade secrets fail to have
employees sign restrictive covenants. Perhaps the inherent abrasive-
ness of a non-disclosure agreement or an employee's apprehension
in signing a legal covenant contribute to the unwillingness to use
restrictive agreements. In addition, many businesses are unaware of
the importance or availability of nondisclosure agreements. Thus,
employers seek alternative forms of protection when an employee
breaches a duty of secrecy.
2 Implied Contract. -To protect the property of an employer,
the law may imply in the contract a prohibition against general be-
trayal of trust and confidence and against specific revelation of confi-
dential information to third parties. 9° Absent an express covenant,
Pennsylvania courts are reluctant to base relief on an implied con-
tract.9 ' Generally, courts are not anxious to restrict employees or
business partners when the parties could have agreed upon express
restrictions on their own. Consequently, the implied contract theory
of relief has afforded minimal protection against disclosures of trade
secrets.
3. Confidential Relationshp. -In a majority of jurisdictions,92
courts provide protection against disclosure of trade secrets by focus-
87. See S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1645 (3d ed. 1972).
88. Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612
(1967).
89. Id at 452, 235 A.2d at 620.
90. The doctrine of implied contract, as used to describe the protection afforded by oper-
ation of law, is distinguishable from contractual provisions that are implied in fact. As one
court noted,
The one class consists of those contracts which are evidenced by the acts of the par-
ties and not by their verbal or written words--true contracts which rest upon an
implied premise in fact. The second class consists of contracts implied by law where
none in fact exist---quasi or constructive contracts created by law and not by the
intentions of the parties.
Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 401-02, 113 N.E. 337, 338-39 (1916). See R. MILGRAM, rUpra
note 55, § 4.02 at 4-5. See also H. NIMs, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-
MARKS, (2d ed. 1917); Hannigan, The Implied Obligation ofan Employee, 77 U. PA. L. REV.
970 (1929).
91. Quaker State Oil Ref. Co. v. Talbot, 315 Pa. 517, 174 A.2d 99 (1934); Pressed Steel
Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 A. 4 (1904). A minority of jurisdictions
recognize an implied contract against disclosure if the employee knows of the trade secret by
virtue of his employment. Elaterite Paint & Mfg. Co. v. S.E. Frost Co., 105 Minn. 239, 117
N.W. 388 (1908); McComb v. McClelland, 223 Or. 475, 354 P.2d 311 (1960).
92. See R. MILGRAM, supra note 55, § 4.03 at 4-12.
ing on the existence of a confidential relationship between the par-
ties. Under the Restatement of Torts93 and the Restatement
(Second) of Agency,94 relief may be predicated on the unprivileged
use or disclosure of another's trade secret if such disclosure consti-
tutes a breach of confidence reposed in defendant by plaintiff. Sig-
nificantly, Pennsylvania courts fail to reach the issue of breach of
confidential relations if no trade secret has been established. Fol-
lowing this rationale, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania clearly re-
fused to consider how the adverse party learned of the information
because no trade secret was established by plaintiff.95
Even when the availability of a legal basis for relief is found,
Pennsylvania courts often will not grant relief in trade secret cases to
avoid restraining an employee's liberty or commercial trade.96 By
refusing legitimate legal relief, courts have substantially lessened
protection against misappropriation of trade secrets.
C The Present Trend in Pennsylvania/or Trade Secret Protection
1. The Wexler and Van Products Approach. -Perhaps the most
revealing and influential Pennsylvania holdings in the field of trade
secrets were decided in the 1960's. Earlier decisions97 generally fa-
vored the employer and offered strong protection against employee
dissemination of trade secrets. By 1960, the supreme court began
balancing the right of an owner to maintain trade secrets with the
right of an employee to pursue a chosen profession. The result was
greater freedom for employees and less protection for employers.
In Wexler v. Greenberg, 98 plaintiff, a manufacturer of chemical
products, hired the defendant Greenberg as chief of its research fa-
93. The Restatement states that unprivileged use or disclosure of another's trade secret
creates liability if such "disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in [de-
fendant] by [plaintiff] in disclosing the secret to [defendant]." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757b
(1939).
94. Basically, the elements of a cause of action for a breach of confidence are: (1) posses-
sion by plaintiffs of knowledge or information which is not generally known; (2) communica-
tion by the plaintiff to defendant under an express or implied agreement limiting its use or
disclosure by the defendant; and (3) use or disclosure by the defendant of the knowledge or
information so obtained in violation of the confidence, to the injury of the plaintiff. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958). Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Re-
fining Co., 150 F. Supp. 143, 159 (E.D. Tex. 1956).
95. Compare Van Products Co. & Gen. Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213
A.2d 769 (1965) with Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
96. See notes 97-105 and accompanying text infra Contra, Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin
v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396b
(1958). The Restatement explains that "unless otherwise agreed, after termination of the
agency, the agent . . . has a duty to the principal not to take advantage of a still subsisting
confidential relation created during the prior agency relation." Id
97. See, e.g., Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838
(1957); Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86 A. 688 (1913); Fralich v.
Despar, 165 Pa. 24, 30 A. 521 (1894). Contra, Pittsburgh Cut Wire Co. v. Sufrin, 350 Pa. 31, 38
A.2d 33 (1944); Belmont Laboratories v. Heist, 300 Pa. 542, 151 A. 15 (1930).
98. 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960).
cilities. As chief chemist, Greenberg analyzed and duplicated com-
petitors' products and then used the resulting information to develop
various new formulas. After nine years, Greenberg left plaintiff cor-
poration and began work with a competitor. Subsequently, the com-
petitor, with Greenberg's assistance, embarked on a full-scale
program to manufacture products similar to that of plaintiff. The
Chancellor held that defendant had misappropriated trade secrets
and awarded relief to plaintiff.99 In reversing the lower court, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to recognize a covenant, ex-
press or implied, to bind defendant to a duty of secrecy.1°°
The Wexler decision is surprising' 0' because trade secrets were
an integral part of defendant's work. After nine years, it is reason-
able to assume defendant understood that his employer would not
want his own formulas disclosed. Yet, the Supreme Court reversed
the lower court's holding. The Wexler court apparently denied relief
solely on the policy consideration that the right of employee mobility
was superior to the right of an owner to maintain proprietary secrets.
Five years after Wexler, the definition of a trade secret was re-
examined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Van Products Co. v.
General Welding and Fabricating Co. 102 In that case plaintiff failed
to meet the definitional hurdle at the supreme court level. The lower
court determined that "[t]he trade secret here involved is all embrac-
ing rather than confined to any particular phase of its functioning. It
is. . .rather the whole picture. . . and marketable product and the
know-how all along the line."'0 3 The supreme court rejected this
totality of the circumstances argument. Furthermore, the Van Prod-
ucts court withheld trade secret protection from the concept of
99. The lower court decreed that Greenberg and defendant company, jointly and sever-
ally, be enjoined permanently from disclosing the formulas or processes or any substantially
similar formulas and from making or selling resulting products. 399 Pa. at 571, 160 A.2d at
431. For a discussion of equitable remedies see notes 169, 170 and accompanying text infra
100. Approximately three months passed between the initial negotiations between Green-
berg and the defendant company and Greenberg's actual departure. This lame duck period is
critical for an employer since during that time the employee's allegiance and loyalty may
transfer to the new employer. The Wexler Court failed to recognize the potential harm to the
plaintiff during this period of employment.
In an analogous situation, Justice Musmanno stated,
Perhaps the moral position of the defendants would have been improved if they had
left the ship of their current employment as soon as they began to lay the keel for the
ship which was to offer not only competition but possible shipwreck to the vessel of
their original allegiance.
Spring Steels Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 357, 162 A.2d 370, 372 (1960).
101. A close reading of the decision reveals that the court acknowledged trade secrets
existed. 399 Pa. at 574, 160 A.2d at 432 n.2. Furthermore, the court recognized that post-
employment protection is needed to insure that valuable developments or improvements are
exclusively those of the employer. "Without some means of protection the businessman could
not afford to subsidize research or improve current methods." Id at 436, 160 A.2d at 435. See
also Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co. Ltd., 239 Mass. 158, 131 N.E.
307 (1921); Extrin Foods Inc. v. Leighton, 202 Misc. 592, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1952).
102. 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965).
103. Id at 257, 213 A.2d at 774.
know-how because it was "a very fuzzily defined area"'" and too
broad to gain protection.
By rejecting the whole picture and know-how theories, the Van
Products court narrowed the definition of a trade secret. 10 5 More-
over, if no trade secret was established, a court need not reach the
issue of legal protection. In effect, the supreme court left the door
wide open for trusted employees to switch allegiances and reveal
trade secrets without fear of judicial interference.
2. Plaintiff's Path to Protection. -To prevail, plaintiff must
show (1) a legally protectable trade secret; (2) a legal basis upon
which to predicate relief; and (3) nonrestraint of free competition
and employee mobility. The first'0 and second 10 7 elements usually
present questions of fact for plaintiff. Since plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the misappropriation of trade secrets
and subsequent disclosure to third parties, plaintifi's burden is ex-
traordinarily difficult. In reality, plaintiff is confronted with eviden-
tiary problems because misappropriation "can rarely be proved by
convincing direct evidence."'' 0 Chief Judge Lord of the United
States District Court explained:
In most cases plaintiffs must construct a web of perhaps ambigu-
ous circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact may draw
inferences which convince him that it is more probable than not
that what plaintiffs allege happened did in fact take place.
Against this often delicate construct of circumstantial evidence
there frequently must be balanced defendants and defendants'
witnesses who directly deny everything. 109
Generally, other courts predicate relief on the first two levels of
analysis. In Pennsylvania, however, the third tier presents public
policy issues which are often within the discretion of the court. The
third element's foundation is based on the overriding judicial policy
against restraint of trade and employee mobility. A person's apti-
tude, skill, dexterity and manual ability are not the property of an
employer unless curtailed through a reasonable restrictive cove-
nant. 110 Acknowledging this concept, courts have balanced the right
104. Id at 263, 213 A.2d at 777. Generally, know-how is defined as a body of unpatented
technology useful in making a product to be sold commercially. It includes a complete body of
manufacturing information needed by an industrial organization to satisfactorily design, de-
velop, fabricate and produce goods. Worthing, Know-How Misuse: A Potential Weaponfor
Licensees, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 177 (1971).
105. See note 43 supra
106. See notes 34-54 and accompanying text supra
107. See notes 90-96 and accompanying text supra
108. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., Inc., 378 F. Supp. 806, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
109. Id
110. The Pennsylvania courts have consistently maintained that "[a] man's aptitude...
his manual and mental ability and such other subjective knowledge as he obtains while in the
course of his employment, are not the property of his employer and the right to use and ex-
pand these powers remains his property .. " Spring Steels Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 356,
of a businessman to be protected against unfair competition stem-
ming from usurpation of his trade secrets and the right of an individ-
ual to the unhampered pursuit of the occupation for which he is best
suited.' I Serious proof problems exist because broad social and ec-
onomic policies are inextricably interwoven with defendant's right to
transfer jobs. Applying the third element, a court sitting in equity
can readily refuse protection since plaintiff cannot deny that an em-
ployee has a right, absent an express agreement, to engage in differ-
ent employment. Plaintiff's heavy burden of proof and the strong
public policy against restraint of employee mobility dictate present
judicial reluctance in the area of trade secret protection.
IV. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in Pennsylvania: Different
Treatment for Nontechnical v. Technical Data
A. Categorizing Trade Secrets
Generally, trade secret misappropriation 1 2 is concerned with
the employer-employee relationship." 3 For example, X is hired by
Y company, and in the course of employment becomes familiar with
a trade secret. X leaves Y and works for Z company and reveals the
trade secret to Z During X's initial employment with Y company,
trade secrets may be developed either prior to X's arrival or during
X's employment. Often it is the combination of the employer's
money, facilities and opportunity coupled with the employee's skill,
know-how and diligence that produces a secret formula, process or
compilation of business information. At times, it is only the em-
ployee's labor that produces the trade secret."
4
Within the employment relationship, the interests involved are
simple to define, yet difficult to protect, particularly in the face of
technological advances. The purpose of this section is to provide an
analysis and clarification of trade secret protection presently avail-
able within the employment relationship, since, absent a restrictive
covenant, Pennsylvania courts afford varying degrees of protection,
depending on the phase in which the trade secret develops.
162 A.2d 370, 373 (1960). See Pittsburgh Cut Wire Co. v. Sufrin, 350 Pa. 31, 38 A.2d 33
(1944).
111. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960).
112. See note 2 supra
113. Similarly, trade secret misappropriation may arise from a number of business rela-
tionships. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. L-M Manufacturing Co., 256 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1958)
(manufacturer v. sales agent); General Business Servs. Inc. v. Rouse, 495 F. Supp. 526 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (franchisor v. potential franchisee); Permagrain Prods. v. U.S. Mat & Rubber Co.,
489 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (seller v: buyer); Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 488 F. Supp. 592
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (competitors); Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Baldwin, 15 Ill. App. 3d 528, 373
N.E.2d 1000 (1978) (fiduciary relationship).
114. An employee may develop a trade secret outside the employment relationship. Nev-
ertheless, an employer may claim a right in the product. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Johnson, 409 F.
Supp. 190 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
1. Pre-existing Trade Secrets. -The strongest protection avail-
able to possessors of trade secrets is when a previously developed
trade secret is disclosed to an employee, so that the employee may
perform the duties expected of him.It5 Once an employer turns over
to the employee the preexisting trade secret, a pledge of secrecy is
impliedly extracted from the employee."t 6 Under tort theory, 17 le-
gal relief is predicated on the trust and confidence stemming from
the employment relationship. In addition, the competitor, who
utilizes the trade secret subsequent to receiving notice of the nature
of the proprietary information, may be subject to liability even if the
trade secret was acquired innocently and without knowledge of the
violated trust. " 8
2. Crucible-Product Effect. -When both the employer and em-
ployee contribute to the development or formulation of a trade se-
cret, the trade secret results from what is called the crucible-
product' ' effect. The commingling of both employer and employee
efforts makes it difficult to determine who developed the trade secret.
Defining the rights of parties with respect to the product is extremely
complicated and courts disagree on the treatment of crucible-prod-
uct trade secrets.'
20
115. See Franke v. Witschels, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d
369 (7th Cir. 1953); Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 29 N.J. Super. 361, 102 A.2d 90 (1954); Pressed
Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 A. 4 (1904).
116. In Extrin Foods, Inc. v. Leighton, 202 Misc. 592, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1952), the court
explained that, "[e]ven though the contract of hiring contained no express covenant, the indi-
vidual defendants by an implied agreement bound themselves not to disclose, reveal or appro-
priate secret processes or formula." Id at 597, 115 N.Y.S.2d at 434. See generally Blake,
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960); Carpenter, Validity of
Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 244 (1928).
117. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
118. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 758(b) (1939) explains liability of good faith recipients of
trade secrets:
One who learns another's trade secret from a third person without notice that it is
secret and that the third person's disclosure is a breach of his duty to the other, or
who learns the secret through a mistake without notice of the secrecy and the mis-
take,. . . is liable to the other for a disclosure or use of the secret after receipt of such
notice, unless prior thereto he has in good faith paid value for the secret or has so
changed his position that to subject him to liability would be inequitable.
Id See also Computer Print Syss. Inc. v. Lewis, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 422 A.2d 148 (1980).
119. The crucible-product effect is distinguishable from the shop right doctrine. The shop
right concept is an equitable doctrine that gives the employer a royalty-free, non-exclusive
license to utilize intellectual property created by an employee where the employee has used his
employer's time, money, tools and materials to produce a useful result. Under the shop right
concept, the invention is developed outside the scope of employment but during working
hours. The crucible-product effect is broader and an employee may be hired specifically to
develop a trade secret. See Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co. Ltd., 239
Mass. 158, 131 N.E. 307 (1921). The court maintained that the nature of the employment
"impresses on the employees suclA a relationship of trust and confidence as estops him from
claiming as his own property that which he has brought into being solely for the benefit, and at
the express procurement of his employer." Id at 160, 131 N.E. at 309.
120. Compare Wellington Print Works v. Magid, 242 F. Supp. 614 (E.D. Pa. 1965) with
Blum v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 183 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1950). See also United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933); Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 106
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court soundly rejected the concept
of a crucible-product trade secret when it maintained that it was
"conceptually impossible. . . to elicit an implied pledge of secrecy
from the sole act of an employee turning over to his employer a trade
secret which he, the employee, has developed."'' 21 Following this ap-
proach, the employee has a right to transfer jobs and disclose the
trade secrets to a competitor. Not only is the employer deprived of a
potentially valuable trade secret, but the use of restrictive covenants
is fostered.
In contradistinction to the Pennsylvania approach, other courts
have recognized a need for protection of crucible-product trade
secrets. 2 2 The Sixth Circuit, in B.F Gladding & Co. v. Scientific An-
glers, 123 has broadly asserted: "Even without any specific mention
• . . joint trade secrets would be protected against unlawful disclo-
sure by one of the parties."'' 24 Other courts have provided injunctive
relief when a key employee transfers jobs and threatens to disclose
trade secrets to a rival company.1
2 5
Affording protection at the crucible-product stage makes sense
since great sums of money and resources may be used to produce a
trade secret that can be destroyed by the simple act of disclosure to a
competitor. In addition, competitors may enjoy a windfall by avoid-
ing the development costs of the trade secret. Denying protection
gives competitors an incentive to passively await the opportunity to
hire away trade secrets. Moreover, employees, knowing the value of
the trade secret, may use subtle blackmail to obtain greater compen-
sation from employers.
An important remedy is injunctive relief to restore the status
quo that existed prior to the violation.' 26  The injunction deprives
defendant of any benefit from his misappropriation, but does not
F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Toner v. Sobelman, 86 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Allen Mfg.
Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509, 144 A.2d 306 (1958); Tolman Laundry v. Walker, 171 Md. 7, 187
A. 837 (1936); Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, 29 R.I. 399, 71 A. 802 (1909). See generally Marmarek,
The Inventor's Common-Law Rights Today, 13 N.Y.L.F. 274 (1967).
121. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 578, 160 A.2d 430, 434 (1960).
122. Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890); Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc. v. Row-
land, 460 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1972); Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md.
1958); Marcalus Mfg. Co. v. Sullivan, 142 N.J. 434, 60 A.2d 330 (1948).
123. 245 F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1957). See also Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290
(5th Cir. 1970).
124. B.F. Gladding & Co. v. Scientific Anglers, 245 F.2d 722, 729 (5th Cir. 1970).
125. In B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963), the
court focused on the nature of the employment in issuing injunctive relief. The facts revealed
that plaintiff manufacturer had spent years to develop a ful-pressure space suit. Upon a po-
tential threat of disclosure to defendant's new employer, the court awarded equitable relief
based on defendant's wrongful conduct in violating the original employment confidence. Eq-
uitable intervention is sanctioned "when it appears. . . that there exists a present real threat of
disclosure, even without actual disclosure." Id at 498, 192 N.E.2d at 105. See also E.I. du-
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 41 Del. 533, 200 A.2d 428 (1964).
126. See note 170 and accompanying text infra
deny the right to pursue a livelihood. This approach compares fa-
vorably with the federal and state policy of promoting good working
relations and fair dealing, since the parties-are returned to an equal
footing. The flexibility of equitable remedies allows a court to be
imaginative and to focus on the hardships and interests of each
party, yet avoid conffict with the overriding policy favoring free
competition and employee mobility. 127
B. Nontechnical Data." Pennsylvania's Two-Prong Test
Perhaps the greatest source of judicial controversy surrounds
the treatment of customer lists and customer information as trade
secrets. ' 28 Technically, every customer name is in the public domain
and therefore not a trade secret in a pure sense. The courts recog-
nize, however, that the customer list is an extremely valuable "com-
pilation of information"' 29 and, if kept secret, may qualify for legal
protection.
Since nontechnical 3° data is easily copied or memorized, 31
businesses are faced with security problems when employees termi-
nate employment. The issue is whether an employee, who has
knowledge of his former employer's customers, can provide confi-
dential listings to his current employer. Courts disagree on the ap-
propriate answer.
132
In Pennsylvania, the majority view treats customer lists as trade
secrets. 133 It was not until 1957, in Morgan's Home Equqment Corp.
127. See generally, Berryhill, Trade Secret Litigation: Injunctions and Other Equitable
Remedies, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 189 (1977); Johnson, Remedies in Trade Secret Litigation, 72
Nw. U.L. REV. 1004 (1978).
128. The judicial disagreements arise from the factual distinctions in each case. See Bur-
roughs Corp. v. Cimakasky, 346 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United Ins. Co. of America v.
Dienno, 248 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Murphy v. Murphy, 28 I. App. 3d 475, 328 N.E.2d
642 (1975); Colonial Laundries v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 138 A. 47 (1927). See also R. MILORAM,
supra note 55, § 2.09[7] at 2-120. See generally Comment, A Balanced.Approach to Employer-
Employee Trade Secrets Disputes in California, 31 HASTINGS L.J 671, 675-87 (1980).
129. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939).
130. For the purpose of this comment, nontechnical data includes, inter alia, customer
information, customer lists, business data, and customer route information.
131. No distinction is made between memorized and written trade secrets that are misap-
propriated. See American Republic Ins. Co. v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 533
(D. Or. 1968); A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Products Corp., 268 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964). See also R. CALLMANN,
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, § 442 (3d ed. 1968).
132. Compare Sims v. Mack Truck, 488 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1980) and Textile Rubber
& Chem. Co. v. Shook, 243 Ga. 587, 255 S.E.2d 705 (1979), with United Ins. Co. of America v.
Dienno, 248 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1965). See also Wiegand Co. v. Trent, 122 F.2d 920 (3d
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 667 (1942) (when no trade secrecy is involved, use of customer
list is permissible); Vincent Horwitz Co. v. Cooper, 352 Pa. 7, 41 A.2d 820 (1945) (no injunc-
tion to restrain use of customer lists that were available through published lists of suppliers
and other catalogue and sales publications); Elliott v. Skillkrafters, Inc., 271 Pa. 185, 114 A.
488 (1921) (surreptitiously obtained lists of plaintiils customers ordered to be returned).
133. Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957).
v. MartuccI, 34 that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated the rule
explicitly:
In many businesses, permanent and exclusive relationships are es-
tablished between customers and salesmen. The customer lists
and customer information which have been compiled by such
firms represent a material investment of employer's time and
money. This information is highly confidential and constitutes a
valuable asset. Such data has been held to be. . .a trade secret
for which an employer is entitled to protection, independent of a
non-disclosure contract .... 135
The court's expansive definition would afford trade secret protection
to most business secrets.
Since Morgan, however, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has consistently narrowed the scope of protection for nontechnical
data by developing stricter prima facie standards.' 36 Currently, to
qualify nontechnical information for trade secret protection the judi-
cial inquiry focuses on: (1) whether the information is obtainable in
significant part; and (2) whether the information is "freely and eas-
ily' 137 obtainable. a'3  Generally, data that is available without great
difficulty fails to gain protection. 139 Under the first prong, courts re-
gard the list or compilation of information in toto. For example, if a
defendant shows that a significant part of a list was easily obtainable,
he reaps the benefit of the entire list.'" Thus, plaintiff may be de-
prived of the most valuable and secretive portion of the list. Fur-
thermore, this standard is arbitrary, within the court's discretion, and
may lead to costly source checking to establish whether a portion of
the list was easily obtainable.'
4 1
The second level of analysis focuses on the degree of difficulty
in obtaining information that was compiled by an independent
source. Problems of proof are implicated, since time studies would
presumably be necessary to show ease of compilation. 142 Under the
two-prong test, Pennsylvania courts have refused protection for dis-
134. Id
135. Id at 623, 136 A.2d at 842 (emphasis added).
136. Accord Capital Bakers Inc. v. Townsend, 426 Pa. 188, 231 A.2d 292 (1967); Carl
Colteryohn Dairy Inc. v. Schneider Dairy, 415 Pa. 276, 203 A.2d 469 (1964).
137. Denawetz v. Milch, 407 Pa. 115, 121, 178 A.2d 701, 704 (1962). The Denawetz court
held that lists compiled from telephone books and from the numerous credit and trade publi-
cations freely available to all interested parties were not protectable trade secrets. "Equity will
not protect mere names and addresses easily ascertainable by observation or by reference to
directions." Id at 121, 178 A.2d at 705.
138. See General Business Servs., Inc. v. Rouse, 495 F. Supp. 526, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
139. Tempo Instrument, Inc. v. Logitek, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Bickley v.
Frutchey Bean Co., 173 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Mich. 1959); Trilog Assocs., Inc. v. Famularo, 455
Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287 (1974).
140. Trilog Assocs., Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287 (1974).
141. General Business Servs., Inc. v. Rouse, 495 F. Supp. 526, 530-31 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
142. Id
tillations of commercial lists,14 3 delivery route lists,' 44 data on the
potential popularity of a design,' 45 and a list of respondents to an
advertising campaign.141
In addition, courts may deny protection on the basis that the
information "could have been"' 47 independently ascertained by the
misappropriator. The success of this defense severely limits trade
secret protection. Since a trade secret may be developed from infor-
mation entirely in the public domain, a court's willingness to specu-
late expands the scope of nonprotectable information. Even though
plaintiff may have expended a significant amount of time and ex-
pense to compile information, defendant's superior compilation abil-
ity, may prove fatal to plaintiffs case. 148  Hence, trade secret
protection that was otherwise available under Morgan's Home Equip-
ment Corp. v. Martucci, 49 has been eroded by the court's application
of the two-prong test.
C. Technical Trade Secrets-General v. Specyc Test
Formulas, 5 0 processes,i 5' and devices 5 2 may qualify as techni-
cal trade secrets. At the rudimentary level of research, courts are
inclined to rule out the existence of a trade secret. "Protection for
ideas not yet concrete and mere ideas for research would inhibit de-
velopment by others of the as yet imperfect technology which is ben-
efiting no one, in particular the public."' 53 Most courts do provide
greater protection when research has developed a viable process or
device,' 54 but Pennsylvania does not necessarily follow that ap-
proach.
143. Van Prods. Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769
(1965).
144. In Carl Colteryahn Dairy v. Schneider Dairy, 415 Pa. 276, 203 A.2d 469 (1964), the
court held that route listings memorized by a former employee were not trade secrets. The
court explained that "[i]f the identity of a majority of a competitor's route customers was
desired, it could be ascertained without great difficulty in most instances; a delivery truck need
only be followed during a period of one or two runs. . . . The time and expense of this tactic
would be almost nominal." Id at 280, 203 A.2d at 473.
145. Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 488 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
146. Id
147. Trilog Assocs., Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 252, 314 A.2d 287, 292 (1974).
148. See Computer Print Syss., Inc. v. Lewis, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 422 A.2d 148 (1980).
149. 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957). See notes 134-136 supra
150. West v. Alberto Culver Co., 486 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1973) (hair conditioner); Wood
v. Sloman, 150 Mich. 177, 114 N.W. 317 (1907) (improved breakfast cereal); Watkins v. Lan-
don, 52 Minn. 389, 54 N.W. 193 (1893 (liniment).
151. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967) (aromatics); Abbot
Labs v. Norse Chem. Corp., 33 Wis. 2d 445, 247 N.W.2d 529 (1967) (artificial sweeteners).
152. Art Wire & Stamping Co. v. Johnson, 141 N.J. Eq. 101, 56 A.2d 11 (1947) (slide
fasteners); Westervelt v. National Paper & Supply Co., 154 Ind. 673, 57 N.E. 552 (1900)
(machine for making bags).
153. Kane, Limitations on the Law of Trade Secrets, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 162, 171 (1971).
154. Accord, Forest Labs, Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Wis. 1969);
Drew Chem. v. Star Chem. Co., 258 F. Supp. 827 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
In contrast to the nontechnical trade secret test, the technical
test potentially provides greater protection. In an early case, Mac-
beth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach'"I the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court established the standard for technical trade secret protection.
The Macbeth court maintained that 'articular secrets of the com-
plaining employer not the general secrets of the trade" were protect-
able even absent a restrictive-covenant. 5 6  The supreme court
opined that the knowledge of the trade secret came to the employee
by reason of the position he occupied and the confidence placed in
him by his employer. By distinguishing between general and specific
secrets, the court recognized that secrets generally known within a
particular industry are not protectable.
The Macbeth test has remained the standard in Pennsylvania
since 1913. Nevertheless, specificity does not assure judicial protec-
tion. While a technical trade secret may be lost by independent in-
vention by a competitor or reverse engineering, it is also lost if the
nature of the secret is ascertainable upon inspection, 157 including in-
spection during plant tours or exhibition displays. 58
One factor that may indicate trade secret misappropriation is
the amount of time it takes for a competitor to reproduce a product
or process with the trade secret information. For instance, if it takes
plaintiff company's research department ten years to develop a secret
formula and plaintiffs employee transfers to a competitor who sub-
sequently produces a similar formula in seven months, there is a rea-
sonable presumption that the rival company used the
misappropriated trade secret. Pennsylvania courts, however, disre-
gard the "lapsed time"' 59 issue as insignificant. 60 Certain federal
and state courts, on the other hand, consider this conduct an indice
of misappropriation. 16
Generally, technical trade secrets form an integral part of busi-
ness operations and their value is often commensurate with the size
and growth rate of the business. Unintentional disclosure of techni-
cal trade secrets may result in financial loss or ruin. Under Penn-
155. 239 Pa. 76, 86 A. 688 (1913).
156. Id at 85, 86 A. at 693 (emphasis added).
157. See notes 59-68 and accompanying text supra
158. Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cer.
denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Serv., Inc., 476 F.2d 386
(8th Cir. 1973).
159. Lapsed time is the period between when the trade secret was misappropriated and
when defendant produced results with the information. Defendant may show that the formula
or process was developed independently thus nullifying the presumption and the allegation of
misappropriation.
160. Van Products Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769
(1965). The lapsed time was two months and the supreme court attributed this rapid reproduc-
tion of a competitor's product to the employee's industriousness.
161. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Computer Print Syss., Inc. v.
Lewis, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 422 A.2d 148 (1980).
sylvania's three-tiered standard, 162 plaintiff may prove a technical
trade secret by satisfying the Macbeth test, 163 yet fail to gain judicial
protection because public policy disfavors restraint on trade and free
competition. Despite the reluctance of Pennsylvania courts to in-
hibit employee mobility, the Commonwealth needs adequate legal
safeguards to encourage optimum use of trade secrets and to pro-
mote industrial growth.
V. Recommendations
A. Computer Print Systems Approach
Despite the guidelines promulgated by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania offered a modi-
fied approach to trade secret protection in Computer Print Systems
Inc. v. Lewis."6 In Computer Print Systems, computer programs
were misappropriated by a former employee of plaintiff and used by
defendant company. The Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded
that the programs represented trade secrets even though other com-
petitors had developed programs to achieve similar results. 65 Al-
though the concept of the programs is not protectable, "the specific
programs developed by appellee to accomplish this purpose should
be afforded such protection."'
' 66
In contrast to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Computer
Print Systems court refused to speculate that others might develop
similar programs. "Rather, the fact that competitors could duplicate
the product through investment of their own funds and application
of general programming principles does not preclude trade secret
protection for one who has invested such effort."' 67 Relief was pred-
icated on the breach of a confidential relationship between the em-
ployer and employee. In addition, the court held the third party,
defendant company, liable for the use of the programs after it re-
ceived notice that the programs were trade secrets.
68
The superior court's holding is sound, but the compensatory
damages award is inadequate. Computer Print Systems spent time
and money to develop specialized programs for its customers. The
162. See notes 106-111 and accompanying text supra
163. See note 156 and accompanying text supra
164. - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 422 A.2d 148 (1980).
165. An interesting lower court history exists in this case. The lower court failed to find
that trade secrets existed but the Chancellor concluded that the computer programs were gen-
eral chattels and that defendants should be required to pay for their use under the theory of
unjust enrichment. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937). The superior court re-
jected this theory and held that the programs were trade secrets and relief was predicated on a
breach of confidence. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 758b (1939).
166. - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 422 A.2d 148, 153 n.3 (1980).
167. Id (emphasis added).
168. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 758b (1939). See also note 118 supra
value of the trade secrets lay in the development costs, the unique-
ness of the customer programs, and the potential sale of the data to
other firms. The money damages, however, did not include future
earnings attributable to the use of the trade secrets.169 Moreover, the
second employer was not prohibited from continuing to use the trade
secrets. Therefore, defendant company may have benefitted from
the misappropriation since arguably greater costs in labor and re-
sources would have been expended to develop the programs inde-
pendently.
Because the defendant company is not barred from using the
misappropriated trade secrets, awarding damages to the injured
party is not as strong a deterrent as injunctive relief. Furthermore,
injunctive relief protects the trade secret and maintains it as a valua-
ble asset for plaintiff's future use.. A court may limit the duration of
an injunction to a period of time it would have taken defendant to
discover the trade secrets lawfully through either independent devel-
opment or reverse engineering of plaintiff's product. 70 Accordingly,
an injunction should terminate when the plaintiffs trade secret be-
comes generally known to good faith competitors.
Nevertheless, the Computer Print Systems approach is a signal
169. An alternative method for calculating compensatory damages is to award relief for
the period in which information is entitled to protection as a trade secret, plus the additional
period, if any, in which a misappropriator retains an advantage over good faith competitors
because of misappropriation. No money damages would be awarded once the trade secret is in
the public domain. Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d
Cir. 1949). Another method limits recovery to the period that it would have taken to discover
the trade secret without misappropriation. Carbonline Co. v. Jaraboe, 454 S.W.2d 540 (Mo.
1970). See also UNIFORM TRADE SECRETs ACT § 3 (1980 version) [hereinafter cited as
U.T.S.A.].
170. The scope and availability of injunctive relief to restrain future use and disclosure of
misappropriated trade secrets varies with each jurisdiction. Three principles emerge from de-
cisions awarding injunctive relief: (1) despite a showing of monetary damage, a person likely
to be damaged by a misappropriation may be granted injunctive relief; (2) injunctions in trade
secret cases must reasonably identify the trade secrets to which they relate; (3) injunctions must
terminate within a reasonable time. ABA SECTION OF PAT. T.M. AND COPYRIGHT LAW, No.
402 (1977). Furthermore, since injunctive relief is granted in accordance with equitable princi-
ples, laches and unclean hands are a bar to recovery. Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v.
Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Kubik, Inc. v.
Hall, 56 Mich. App. 335, 224 N.W.2d 80 (1974).
The duration of the injunction has varied among jurisdictions. See K-2 Ski Co. v. Head
Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974) (injunction granted for the period of time it would have
taken defendant either by reverse engineering or by independent development to develop its
ski legitimately without use of the plaintiff's trade secret); Structural Dynamics Research Corp.
v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (imposing
reasonable royalty for the period of time necessary for a competitor to duplicate the program
by independent research).
For examples of different types of injunctions available, see College Watercolor Group,
Inc. v. Win. H. Newbauer, Inc., 468 Pa. 103, 360 A.2d 200 (1976) (permanent injunction);
Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1973) (preliminary injunc-
tion); Kubik, Inc. v. Hull, 56 Mich. App. 335, 224 N.W.2d 80 (1974) (damages only); K-2 Ski v.
Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974) (lead time injunction to eliminate competitive
advantage). For an exhaustive analysis of injunctive relief for trade secret misappropriation,
see Barclay, Trade Secrets. How Long Should an Injunction Last, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 203
(1978).
that the superior court recognizes the harm in permitting employees
to legally disclose trade secrets under the saving judicial doctrines of
employee mobility and free competition. Other Pennsylvania courts
would do well to look to Computer Print Systems for guidance.
B. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act 7' codifies the basic principles
of common law trade secret protection but preserves the essential
distinctions from patent law.'72 Under the Act, a trade secret is in-
formation that derives independent economic value because it is not
generally known to other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use. 173 Presently, Minnesota 174 is the only state
that has adopted the Act.
Standing alone, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act appears to pro-
vide a broader scope of trade secret protection than the Restatement
of Torts. 175 Clearly, the Act overshadows the protection presently
available in Pennsylvania. For example, the definition of a trade
secret is broader because it includes know-how as a protectable se-
cret. In addition, the Act departs from the Restatement of Torts def-
inition, which required that a trade secret be "continuously used in
one's business."' 7 6 Under the Act, protection is extended to a plain-
tiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means to put
a trade secret to use. Finally, the Act provides for injunctive relief
for actual or potential misappropriation. 77 The availability of this
remedy will prevent permanent loss of the trade secret by premature
disclosure into the public domain.
Adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in Pennsylvania
and other states will insure that businesses have notice of the duties
involved in maintaining trade secrets and the remedies available in
the event of misappropriation. Clarification and uniformity in this
area of the law is needed and long overdue.'
78
171. U.T.S.A., supra note 169.
172. See note 17 and accompanying text supra
173. U.T.S.A., supra note 169, § 1 at 5.
174. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325c.01 (West Supp. 1981). The U.T.S.A. is pending in the
legislatures of Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, and Washington.
175. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). See also notes 44-54 and accompanying
text supra
176. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939).
177. The Act limits injunctive relief to elimination of the commercial advantage obtained
through misappropriation. Injunctive relief, however, is restricted against good faith acquisi-
tion of a misappropriated trade secret. The Act states:
If the court determines that it would be unreasonable to prohibit future use, an in-
junction may condition future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty for no
longer than the period of time the use could have been prohibited.
U.T.S.A. supra note 169, § 2 at 7.
178. Pennsylvania should be a front runner in adopting the U.S.T.A., as it was with the
Uniform Commercial Code. Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt the U.C.C. (1952 ver-
VI. Conclusion
The law recognizes that trade secrets are entitled to reasonable
protection regardless of the applicable legal standard. Pennsylvania
courts have established narrow standards that are confusing to the
business community and legal practitioners. Clearer guidelines will
promote greater utilization of trade secrets. Adequate protection in-
creases operating efficiency, and promotes growth by permitting dis-
semination of proprietary information to a broader range of
employees and business associates. Thus, the business community is
aided rather than misdirected by unsettled judicial standards.
Although the Computer Print System approach is a positive step
toward greater trade secret protection in Pennsylvania, adoption of
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, or a facsimile, has the advantage of
certain guidelines that offer increased yet reasonable trade secret
protection. Until a uniform statute is adopted, the trade secret pos-
sessor must be aware of the confusing and inconsistent court hold-
ings in Pennsylvania and must attempt to follow the convoluted
judicial standards to avoid severe economic loss of valuable assets.
LEE M. ROSENBLUTH
sion). See Schnadcr, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 72 U. MIAMI L. REv. I (1967).

